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Abstract
November 2006 most likely marks the launch of Sony’s PS3, the
successor to PS2. Later, Nintendo is expected to launch the Wii, the
successor to the GameCube. We answer the question in the title by
analyzing the diffusion of the earlier generations of these consoles, and
by using a new model that extends the successive-generations model
of Norton and Bass (1987) by introducing two market players. Based
on interviews with consumers and with retailers, we calibrate part
of this model. The main outcome is that an optimal launch time is
around June 2007, as then total sales of Nintendo’s GameCube and
Wii would get maximized.
2
1 Introduction
This paper concerns the optimal moment to launch the next generation of a
product, given that the current generation still yields sales, and given that
there is a competitor who also has a current generation and who has an-
nounced the date of the introduction of its own next generation. Although
this issue is quite generic from a marketing strategy point of view, we illus-
trate our findings for the case of game consoles. We are aware of the fact
that there are more than two players in this market (think of Microsoft Xbox
360), but in this paper we only focus on the game consoles of Sony and Nin-
tendo.1
November 2006 marks the launch of Sony’s PlayStation 3 (PS3), the suc-
cessor to the PlayStation 2 (PS2). Nintendo is expected to launch the Wii
(Revolution), the successor to GameCube, but at the time of writing, June
2006, it is unknown when it would do so. For sure, the launch of Wii will
not occur before November 2006, and it will most likely occur in 2007 or
even later. Both current generation products have been and still are very
successful, and it is expected that both next generation products will be too.
The consoles rely on their own games, although there is overlap in titles and
in type of games. Hence, both current and future products can be viewed as
serious competitors.
1Microsoft just recently launched Xbox 360, and in this study we assume that adopters
of this recent product do not already switch to new generations of Sony and Nintendo and
that adopters of current generations of Sony and Nintendo products do not switch to Xbox
360 after the newest generations of these two appear in the market. Both assumptions
seem very plausible.
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At first one may think that as the question in the title is a very sim-
ple one, the answer should be simple too. In this paper we will show that
the literature on the optimal moment to launch a new generation product is
scattered and shows various restrictions. For example, many studies consider
the case of a monopoly, hence the absence of competition. In Section 2 of
our paper, where we look at the various strands of literature, we argue that
the results of these monopoly studies cannot immediately be extended to the
case of two market players. One reason is that it leads to the suggestion
to introduce the second generation at the same time as the first one, which,
of course, in a product category like game consoles is impossible. A second
strand of literature, on optimal introduction timing, concerns the case where
the product has never been on the market before, and hence, the product is
completely new. Again, for game consoles, and we believe for many product
categories, this situation does not hold. For game consoles, all individuals
involved in gaming know what one can do with these products, and numer-
ous web sites give ample information on all aspects of these products. A
third strand of literature proposes mathematical models that can be solved
in order to get a prediction of the optimal timing. The key problems with
these models are that one needs to know many parameter values in advance,
and that the models are extremely complicated to analyze.
In this paper we try to meet these problems by proposing a simple model,
with a small number of parameters, which can be used to cases where the
evolution of products is already in its second or third (or more) generation,
and where there are two players. Our model can simply be extended to three
or more players, but for the sake of convenience (and also as our illustration
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does not seem to depend on it) we stick to the two-player case. Our model
extends the familiar successive-generation model of Norton and Bass (1987)
to the case of two competitors. The extension is kept at a basic level, and
further extensions can of course be proposed but are not considered here. We
discuss the details of this model in Section 3. The model is plugged into an
optimization problem, where, given a certain planning horizon, total sales of
the two generations or new sales of the second generation can be maximized.
Our multi-player diffusion model allows the generation buyers from player A
to switch to the next generation of player B, and vice versa. These parame-
ters cannot be estimated using actual sales data, whereas the basic diffusion
parameters can, so we have to rely on interviews with experts. We show that
in case of two players there are only 4 parameters that one needs to retrieve
this way, and that this retrieval can be based on a simple questionnaire. In
the first part of Section 3 we write down the mathematical expressions of
our new diffusion model, whereas in the second part we illustrate the model
for synthetic data. This illustration demonstrates the merits of our simple
model.
In Section 4 we consider our two-player diffusion model for the case of
Wii versus PS3. First, we review a few facts for the game-console industry.
At the time of writing, world-wide sales data on the GameCube and PS2
data are available, and we display these in Table 1. We show that the un-
derlying shape of the diffusion can simply be estimated using a basic Bass
(1969) model. Next, we report on our interviews with 16 experts, 4 of which
are retailers and 12 are consumers who are self-stated hardcore gamers and
hence we treat them as experts. Interestingly, the opinions of the consumers
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are much more coherent. So, even though we show what the various sur-
vey results imply for the optimal timing, we take those of the consumers as
most important. Also, we show that the planning horizon is crucial in the
computations. When we rely on the Bass-based estimation results, on the
consumers’ opinions and on a planning horizon of 2020, we derive that the
optimal timing to launch Wii is June 2007.
Section 5 concludes this paper with a discussion of the potential limi-
tations of our model and of our optimization approach. Next, it outlines
various areas for further research.
2 Literature Review
The academic literature about optimal timing is scattered and it shows some
restrictions and puzzling views. For example, planned obsolescence research
and industrial organization literature have dealt with monopolies and cartels
behavior and both research streams suggest that firms have strong incentives
to sell products with shorter than socially desirable lives. This entails that it
seems beneficial not to launch the next version of a product simultaneously
with the previous one, and not to launch the next version after the market
has cleared. However, rivalry might force firms to increase products’ lives
and to delay the introduction of new products. Hence, in economics, many
studies have centered around the question whether firms have incentives to
sell products with shorter than socially desirable lives and around the ques-
tion when it is optimal for a firm to adopt a new technology of production
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in a competitive environment2, see Waldman (1993), Bulow (1986), Lee and
Lee (1998), Fishman et al. (1993) and Swan (1972).
The question regarding the timing of innovations, nonetheless, has been
addressed directly by economists. Scholars in economics have examined
whether it is optimal for firms to adopt an innovation at the same time or
at a different date than competitors, and whether it is optimal for a firm to
launch as soon as possible or delay the launching of a new product. Scherer
(1967) and Barzel (1968) were among the first to pay attention to inno-
vations’ introduction time. Scherer (1967) suggested that, under rivalry, a
firm’s strategic equilibrium is to introduce new products at the same time as
its competitors. Meanwhile, Barzel (1968) argued that firms’ managers will
have strong incentives to adopt or launch an innovation as soon as possible
due to competition. Not in line with them, Reinganum (1981) found that
firms under rivalry should adopt an innovation at different dates in order to
maximize profits. Only for the case that Reinganum (1981) calls “degen-
erate”, in which the costs of delaying adoption are much greater than the
benefits of delaying, firms should launch or adopt as soon as possible regard-
less of their competitors’ strategies. Similar to Reinganum (1981), Fudenberg
and Tirole (1985) concluded that oligopoly firms’ strategic equilibrium is to
2The second question is particularly interesting given that it is analogous to our research
problem. Most studies in economics have examined the following context: A firm has a
current production technology and it should decide when to adopt a new technology given
its current and future profits stream, the cost of adopting and the threat of competitors’
earlier adoption of a better technology. Similarly, we are interested in the context in which
a firm is selling a product in the market and it should decide when to launch a new product
given its current and future profits’ stream and the threat of earlier products’ launch of
competitors.
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adopt or launch an innovation at different dates. However, if an innovation is
advantageous only when competitors have not adopted, Fudenberg and Ti-
role (1985) argued that firms’ incentives will lead them to adopt at the same
time and as soon as possible. Finally, Kamien and Schwartz (1972) argued
that increased competition might lead to either earlier or delayed innovation
adoption depending on product similarity between competitors, the proba-
bility of competitors’ entrance and the costs structure of firms. All these
findings are important but might not hold in the context in which we are
interested. One of the reasons is that most scholars assumed linear demand
functions and consequently they left aside the typical S-shaped diffusion that
match the well known product life cycle encountered almost everywhere.
2.1 Monopoly
To our knowledge, only Wilson and Norton (1989) and Mahajan and Muller
(1996) have studied when it is optimal to launch multi-generation products.
They are the only scholars who have developed a theoretical model, which
in both cases is based on Norton and Bass (1987). Both Wilson and Norton
(1989) and Mahajan and Muller (1996) examine the case of a monopoly pro-
ducing a sequence of new products. According to Wilson and Norton (1989),
there are three critical issues which affect the optimal introduction time of a
new generation. These are the interrelationship of sales of the two products,
their profit margins and the planning horizon. Surprisingly, their model pro-
vides two optimal solutions regardless of the relevance of these factors. They
conclude that different versions of a product should be introduced either all
at the same time or sequentially (not overlapping). Moreover, the behavioral
premises proposed by Wilson and Norton (1989) do not exactly resemble the
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premises proposed by Bass (1969) as their model includes a non-linear infor-
mation function to describe consumer behavior.
In a similar vein, Mahajan and Muller (1996) conclude that a new prod-
uct’s generation should be introduced as soon as it is available or it should
be delayed to a much later stage, that is, to the maturity of the previous
generation. They further argue that a new generation should be introduced
simultaneously with the preceding one only if the market potential of the
latter is large. Otherwise, a new generation should be introduced when the
maximum profits of the previous generation are almost reached, a stage that
they call maturity. The model of Mahajan and Muller (1996) is composed of
four equations and 30 parameters and to simplify it they assume that innova-
tion and imitation become slightly better from one generation to the next one.
Important facts to notice both in Wilson and Norton (1989) and Mahajan
and Muller (1996) are that they propose to introduce the next generation of
a product either at T = 0, delay it permanently to T = ∞, or to launch
only when the first product version cumulative sales S1(t) almost reach a
maximum. Second, their findings are only special cases of the timing strate-
gies studied by Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), Reinganum (1981) and Kamien
and Schwartz (1972). For example, Kamien and Schwartz (1972) found that
T = 0 is optimal only if firms need to take advantage of a profit stream that
would be smaller once competitors come in and T =∞ is optimal only under
extreme rivalry between firms. More recently, Cohen et al. (1996), Radas and
Shugan (1998) and Savin and Terwiesch (2005) proposed different views and
incorporated competition in their studies. Nevertheless, these later authors’
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theoretical models are extremely difficult to analyze, depend on many pa-
rameters or do not describe S-shaped sales paths that are typically observed
in practice.
2.2 When you are first to launch
The optimal introduction time depends mostly on the degree of substitution
and the relation between different generations. Peterson and Mahajan (1978)
proposed four possible interactions between innovations, that is, they can be
independent, complementary, contingent or be substitutes. They provided
the following examples; that is, housing and electric trash compactors as in-
dependent products, washers and dryers as complements, computer software
and hardware as contingent, and finally color television and black and white
television as substitutes. Furthermore, products’ introduction times might
as well depend on firms’ objectives like to replace a product, to sell a line
extension or to offer upgrades, see Purohit (1994).
We have little knowledge about how products’ interactions and firm ob-
jectives affect products’ launch time and the outcomes of products’ entry
timing, but for the single generation case they have been documented exten-
sively in marketing literature. However, there is still no consensus if early
timing leads to higher profits and firms’ survival or not, see Shankar et al.
(1998), Shankar et al. (1999), Krishnan et al. (2000), Lehmann and Pae
(2003) ,Bridges et al. (1993), Morgan et al. (2001), Golder and Tellis (1993),
Golder and Tellis (1997) and Mitra and Golder (2002). And again, for game
consoles, and we believe for many product categories, the context studied by
this literature strand does not hold.
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2.3 Mathematical Models
The basic model of diffusion of new products was proposed by Bass (1969)
and it has been extensively studied in a wide variety of applications and
contexts, see Boswijk and Franses (2005), Danaher et al. (2001) for some ex-
amples and properties of this model, or Mahajan et al. (1990) and Mahajan
and Peterson (1985) for reviews of diffusion models. Later on, Norton and
Bass (1987) extended the Bass model to allow for diffusion and substitution
between a sequence of new products. In addition, Norton and Bass (1992)
forecasted quite accurately the sales path of several sequences of new prod-
ucts and called the Law of Capture to the substitution dynamics between
generations of products described by their model.
Scholars have applied the Norton and Bass model, or similar extensions
of the Bass model, to study several characteristics of multi-generation prod-
ucts. Padmanabhan and Bass (1993) and Bayus (1992) proposed models to
price successive generations of products, Danaher et al. (2001) analyzed the
relation between marketing mix and diffusion of multi-generation products,
Bucklin and Sengupta (1993) examined the diffusion of complementary in-
novations, Kim et al. (2001), Chatterjee and Eliashberg (1990), Kim and
Srinivasan (2001), Jun and Park (1999), Vakratsas and Bass (2002) and
Bayus (1991) studied how and when consumers decide to upgrade to im-
proved products’ versions, Islam and Meade (2000), Islam and Meade (1997)
and Olson and Joi (1985) proposed models for diffusion and replacement of
products, Purohit (1994), Robertson et al. (1995) and Prasad et al. (2004)
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analyzed the introduction strategies of multi-generations products or the re-
lease of single products in multiple channels. Finally, Kim et al. (2000), Kim
and Lee (2005), Peterson and Mahajan (1978) and Islam and Meade (1997)
presented alternative diffusion models for successive generations of products.
Hence, the Norton and Bass (1987) model is still in use today to describe
and forecast the sales patterns of newer versions of products. This model
includes the moment of the introduction of a new generation as a parameter.
One would think that solving the Norton and Bass (1987) model with
respect to this parameter could lead to insights into the optimal timing of
introduction. Surprisingly, the results are twofold. The first is that genera-
tion N+1 must be introduced at the same time as generation N. The second
insight is that N+1 must be introduced by the time all potential adopters
have purchased a product of generation N. We will demonstrate this result
as follows.
In the model of Norton and Bass (1987), sales are proportional to the
cumulative distribution function of the adoption rate F (t) and the market
potentialm. When a second generation is introduced, substitution and adop-
tion effects should be added to the previous equation. For the case of two
generations, they posit that the fist generation follows
S1(t) = m1F1(t)[1− F2(t2 − τ2)], for t > 0, (1)
and that the second generation follows
S2(t) = F2(t− τ2)[m2 + F1(t)m1], for t>τ2 (2)
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That is, after the second generation has been introduced at time τ2, the
first generation’s sales S1(t) become proportional to its cumulative adoption
function F1(t), its market potential m1, and the sales not captured by the
second generation [1 - F2(t2-τ2)] after τ2. The sales of the second gener-
ation S2(t) are proportional to their own market potential m2 and to the
cumulative sales of the first generation F1(t)m1 after τ2. Fi is the cumula-
tive sales function of generation i as proposed by Bass (1969). Therefore,
Fi = [1− e−bit/1 + aie−bi(t)] and ai=qi/pi and bi = pi + qi. It is not difficult
to derive that ∂(S1(t) + S2(t))/∂τ2 = 0 is obtained when τ2 = 0 or τ2 = ∞.
Hence, the basic Norton and Bass (1987) model is not helpful to find the
optimal time to introduce the next generation.
Our literature review indicates that there are various studies in optimal
timing of a new generation. However, these studies all take perspective or
adopt assumptions that are not relevant for our situation. Hence, to de-
scribe the process of two competitors launching next generations of roughly
the same product, and to understand what could be the best moment to
launch a new generation, we are in need of a new model. This model will be
proposed in the next section.
3 A new successive-generations model for two market players
As the Norton and Bass (1987) provides a natural starting point, our first
task is to expand it to a multi-player context, where here the market is com-
posed by two firms. Each firm is assumed to launch over time two generations
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of a new technological product. Our second task is to show, with this new
model, how each firm attempts to maximize its market share and sales, or
any other similar objective, given the observed behavior of its competitor.
Before introducing our multi-player model, it is important to look more
closely at the two generations case proposed by Norton and Bass (1987). If
equation (1) would contain only the term m1F1(t), then the sales S1(t) will
be equivalent to the model of Bass (1969). However, Norton and Bass mul-
tiply the term m1F1(t) with [1− F2(t− τ2)], so that a fraction F2(t− τ2) of
m1F1(t) could be captured by the second generation. Consequently, there
could be a moment in time when F2(t− τ2) will become 1 and all of the first
generation sales will be captured by the second generation and S1(t) = 0.
Additionally, Norton and Bass (1987) design their model such that the
sales lost by the first generation are all transferred to the second generation
by adding F2(t)F1(t)m1 to the sales of the second version, that is m2F2(t),
and therefore S2(t) = m2F2(t) + F2(t)F1(t)m1, that is equation (2). Hence,
the Norton and Bass (1987) model is a very simple and elegant model that
allows diffusion and substitution between two generations of the same prod-
uct. Nevertheless, they restrict their model to the case of a single firm or
single product case, whereas we have two players.
3.1 Our model
In order to expand the Norton and Bass (1987) model and add a second
firm or a second competing product, we should make assumptions about the
relationship between different firms’ products. If we believe that the relation
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between two generations of the same product as in the model proposed by
Norton and Bass also holds between competing products, then a product not
only loses sales that go to its newer version but it also loses sales that go
to the current and future versions of competitors’ products. Therefore, we
stick to the relationship between two generations of the same product as in
the Norton and Bass model, but additionally, we will assume that the sales
that go from one product to its competitors’ versions are proportional to the
cumulative sales function of its competitor’s products.
Formally, if the market is composed by two firms a and b, the sales of
firm a are
Sa1 (t) = S˜
a
1 (t)[1− αaF b1 (t)][1− φaF b2 (t)] (3)
and
Sa2 (t) = S˜
a
2 (t)[1− βaF b1 (t)][1− γaF b2 (t)] (4)
The sales of firm b are
Sb1(t) = S˜
b
1(t)[1− αbF a1 (t)][1− φbF a2 (t)] (5)
and
Sb2(t) = S˜
b
2(t)[1− βbF a1 (t)][1− γbF a2 (t)] (6)
where S˜j1 and S˜
j
2 are defined as
S˜j1 = m
j
1F
j
1 (t)[1− F j2 (t− τ2)] for j = a or b (7)
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and
S˜j2 = F
j
2 (t− τ2)[mj2 + F j1 (t)mj1] for j = a or b (8)
As in the basic Bass model, we have that
F ji (t) = [1− e−bi(t−τ
j
i )/1 + aie
−bi(t−τji )]× I(τ ji > t) for t > 0 (9)
where ai = qi/pi and bi = pi + qi and I(τ
j
i > t) is an indicator function that
equals one when the introduction time of generation i of firm j, τ ji , is larger
than t and zero otherwise. The parameters pi and qi are the innovation and
imitation parameters of generation i, respectively.
Equations (3) to (9) allow for a wide variety of relationships given the
sign and size of the parameters αj, βj, φj and γj for j = a, b. For example,
if all parameters are negative, it means that competition deters sales instead
of increasing them. Another case is that all parameters are positive and that
would mean that competing products complement each other, and that total
sales increase when a new product is introduced in the market. Another in-
teresting case is given when a firm’s product is superior to the competitor’s
products. In this case, one firm would have the equations with positive pa-
rameters and the competing firm faces negative parameters. More complex
relationships might arise depending on the sign and size of αj, βj, φj and γj.
Finally, our formulation could allow for the case of a radical innovation in
the market as it could allow one of the products to absorb all the existing
products’ sales. More detailed illustrative examples follow next.
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3.2 An illustration of the use of our model for synthetic data
The model in (3) to (9) can be plugged into an optimization routine that
can maximize some objective function for values of introduction time. In our
case we have information on the introduction time of one of the players and
we aim to derive the optimal introduction time of the second player.
Given that αj, βj, φj and γj define the relationship between compet-
ing generations of products, it is possible to find the optimal time when a
firm should launch the next generation product. For example, if a firm pro-
duces inferior products and the launch of a competitor’s product will reduce
its sales, then there should be a timing strategy that maximizes its market
share. Or, in the opposite case, if a competitor’s product might enhance
a firm’s sales then there should be a timing strategy that could maximize
its sales. The timing strategy depends heavily on the relationship between
competing generations of products, their launch time and on firms’ planning
horizon.
An objective function for the case of PS3 and Wii could be defined as
follows. The optimal launch times for firm b given firm a launch times τa1
and τa2 are the times τ
b
1 and τ
b
2 that maximize S
b
1(t) and S
b
2(t).
3 Formally we
can state that given a planning horizon T p, these dates are found from
τ b1 = argmax
τb1
{Sb1(T p)} (10)
3In our model, as in the Norton and Bass model, the first generation is completely
replaced by the second generation, that is Sb1(t) → 0 if t → ∞. Therefore, we maximize
the peak of Sb1(t) and not S
b
1(t) directly in any objective function.
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and
τ b2 = argmax
τb2
{Sb2(T p)} (11)
A second function might be to find the optimal introduction times τ b1 and τ
b
2
that maximize the market share of firm’s b products, that is
τ b1 = argmax
τb1
{Sb1(T p)/(Sb1(T p) + Sa1 (T p))} (12)
and
τ b2 = argmax
τb2
{Sb2(T p)/(Sb2(T p) + Sa2 (T p))} (13)
A third alternative could be to find the optimal introduction time for either
the first or second generation such that we will maximize the sales of both
generations. That is,
τ b1 = argmax
τb1
{Sb1(T p) + Sb2(T p)} (14)
and
τ b2 = argmax
τb2
{Sb1(T p) + Sb2(T p)} (15)
To illustrate the use of our model and the consequences of choosing an ob-
jective function, in this case function (13), we will assume T p = 7 years (84
months), ma1 = m
b
1 = 400, m
a
2 = m
b
2 = 500, pi = 0.025 and qi = 0.15 for all i,
αa = 0.2, βa = 0.2, φa = 0.1 and γa = 0.1, while αb, βb, φb, γb are the same
size as for firm a but negative. This makes the generations of firm b superior
to the ones of firm a. If both firms launch their products at the same time,
say their first generation at time 0 and their second generation at time 12,
then the market share of the first and second generations of firm b would be
18
59% and 62%, respectively. Figure 1 depicts the adoption trajectories of all
four products for these two launch times.
As a second case, if it is known that firm a products will be launched at
time 0 and 12, then firm b could maximize its market share, equation (13), by
setting the second generation launch time equal to 20. This strategy would
yield a market share of 67% and 65% for firm’s b first and second genera-
tions. Figure 2 illustrates the adoption trajectories of all four products for
this second case. We can see that in Figure 2 the sales of the second gener-
ation of firm b almost reaches 1300 units, while in Figure 1 they are shown
to reach a level lower than 1100 units. It is also important to notice that
the launching time of the second generation of b occurs later than the second
generation of a. That is, launching a superior product after the introduc-
tion of a competitor’s product does not necessarily give a lower market share.
As a third illustration, in Figure 3 we depict the sales patterns of the four
generations given that the second generation of firm b is a radical innovation.
In this case, γb = −1 and γa = 1. Therefore, the second generation of firm b
absorbs all sales of the second generation of a and eventually of all products
in the market, approximately 1900 units. This number closely corresponds
to the sum of the market potential for each product.
These calculations for synthetic data show that a wide variety of sales pat-
terns possible and that the key parameters are αj, βj, φj and γj. Also, as we
will show in our empirical section below, the planning horizon is important.
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4 Optimal Launch Time for Wii
In this section we will analyze the video game industry and we will suggest the
optimal launch time for a video game console not yet launched, Nintendo’s
Wii. First we review a few industry facts and next we calibrate our model
for a few parameters configurations, where some parameters are obtained
through interviews. With these, and an objective function, we derive the
optimal time for launching Wii.
4.1 Facts
Three important players in the video game console industry are Sony, Nin-
tendo and Microsoft. Console refers to non-pc hardware used to play video
games. All three companies launched several video game consoles in the last
decade and in 2006, a new product is being introduced. Microsoft is relatively
new in the industry because its first console was launched in 2000. However,
Sony and Nintendo have been in the business for longer. Nintendo launched
its first console in 1983, while Sony’s most popular console, the PlayStation,
was launched in the mid nineties. The new console of Sony, PlayStation 3, is
announced to be launched in November 2006, that is one year after Microsoft
launched its latest console, the Xbox 360.
Nintendo is one of the earliest founded companies in the console industry
and at the time of writing we do not have information about the launch date
of its newest console, the Nintendo Wii. The planning context for Nintendo’s
management is very interesting given that the main player in the industry,
Sony, has announced to launch its latest console in November 2006 and al-
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though this data may shift we stick to it in the present version of this paper.
In case the date would change, we can easily adapt our computations. In
the meantime Microsoft Xbox 360 could reach its peak sales this or next year.
4.2 Illustration of our model
Sony launched PlayStation 2 in October 2000 and the company’s manage-
ment is planning to launch PlayStation 3 six years later, in November 2006.
Nintendo’s GameCube was launched in November 2001 and there have been
no announcements about the launch date for its latest console Nintendo Wii.
Up to 2005, Sony has sold 52.1 million PS2 consoles in the United States and
Japan and this product is in the later stages of diffusion, see Table 1. The
sales of PS2 have been decreasing since 2002. Meanwhile, Nintendo Game-
Cube sales in the United States and Japan are about 23.7 million consoles
and its sales have been decreasing since 2003.
We estimate a Bass model for the current generation of Xbox, GameCube
and PS2. Our findings, given in Table 5, suggest that the innovation (p) and
imitation (q) parameters in this industry are on average 0.18 and 0.60, re-
spectively.
In our multi-player model we will set the innovation and imitation param-
eters equal to 0.18 and 0.60. The market potential for PS2 and GameCube
will be set at 33 and 13 million, respectively.4. For the sake of convenience we
assume that these parameters stay constant across generations. While the
4We experimented with other parameters
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market potential for the next generation of the Sony and Nintendo consoles
will be assumed to be 35 and 15 million, respectively.5 The known launch
dates are October 2000 for PS2, November 2001 for Nintendo’s GameCube
and November 2006 for PS3.
The next important step is to obtain estimates of the competitive pa-
rameters αj, βj, φj and γj or loyalty. Hence, we asked a group of twelve
self-stated hardcore gamers to answer a short survey about video game con-
soles in which they had to suggest or predict the size of α, φ β, and γ. The
survey questions are given in Figure 4. We also visited four shops in Rotter-
dam’s City Center and we asked sales people to answer the same survey based
on their knowledge. The competitive parameters αj, βj, φj and γj should
be interpreted as the maximum percentage of sales that are transferred from
one product to its competitors.
4.3 Launching Wii
We will discuss three scenarios. In the first we will assume that the loy-
alty parameters are the average of consumers’ predictions. In the second
and third scenarios we will consider the answers of sales people. To begin
with the consumers’ scenario we will assume that αN = −0.05, φN = −0.21,
βN = −0.06 and γN = 0.29 as these are the average values, see Table 2 for
all answers and Table 4 for a summary.
5We choose these market potentials only for illustration purposes and they will remain
the same across all scenarios. Choosing different market potentials will change only our
scenarios’ total sales while the optimal introduction time, for most scenarios, will remain
roughly the same.
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If the parameters in Table 4 are positive it means that Nintendo is losing
sales to Sony or that the loyalty to Nintendo is low. If the parameters are
negative, it means that Nintendo loyalty is high and that it is receiving sales
from Sony. For example, the average reported for γ in Table 4 is 0.29 and this
is the average of consumers’ answers to question b of our survey, see Figure
4. Question b asks what would be the percentage of sales that GameCube
would gain or lose to Sony PS3, if PS3 is introduced in November 2006. All
consumers answered that the sales of Gamecube will remain the same or de-
crease, so the parameter should be positive, and they think that this decrease
will be, on average, of 0.29 percent. As we can see, consumers believe that
the loyalty parameters should favor Nintendo in most of the parameters ex-
cept for γN = 0.29. This positive γN implies that Nintendo needs to launch
Wii or Sony PS3 will get some proportion of the customers of GameCube as
there is no newer model for Nintendo’s customers to upgrade. Finally, we will
assume that Sony’s loyalty’s parameters are of the same size as Nintendo’s
but with opposite sign.
To find the optimal launch time for Wii, we assume that Nintendo max-
imizes the sales of both GameCube and Wii, that is we assume Nintendo
maximizes the objective function (15). Given a long-term planning horizon
T p = Dec 2020, we consider:
τ b2 = argmax
τb2
{Sb1(T p) + Sb2(T p)} (16)
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Given the consumers based estimates, our model indicates that the optimal
launch time for Nintendo Wii is June 2007. This launch time yields total sales
of 48 million consoles, that is 12.3 million for GameCube and 35.9 million
for Wii. In Figure 5, we depict the total sales that Nintendo could achieve
given different introduction times for Wii. As we can notice, the function is
an inverted U shape and it reaches a maximum in June 2007.
4.4 Other scenarios
We also interviewed retailers at specialized video game stores. The data
is given in Table 3. The sales person of MediaMarkt predicts that αN =
0.0, φN = −0.40, βN = 0.0 and γN = 0.70. With this scenario Wii opti-
mal launch time is November 2006. By launching in November this year,
Nintendo’s total sales will be 50.8 million consoles, that is 11.6 million for
GameCube and 39.2 million for Wii. And, if we were to use the answers of
Dynabyte’s salesman we will get October 2007 as the optimal introduction
time for Wii. This latter scenario’s assumptions are that αN = 0.0, φN =
0.0, βN = 0.0 and γN = 0.20 and its optimal time is close to the June 2007
introduction time implied by consumers’ loyalty parameters.
It is clear that scenarios’ outcomes depend on the relation between dif-
ferent generations of products. They also depend on the planning horizon.
For all computations so far we assumed that the planning horizon is rather
distant in the future. However, the shape of the profit function will change if
the planning horizon would be shorter and if firm b would aim to maximize
diffusion in the shorter run. In Figure 6 we graph the profit function for the
long and short term planning horizons T p = Dec 2020 and T p = Dec 2012
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using consumers’ parameters again. We chose 2012 with the purpose of re-
sembling what could be the planning horizon of video game producers. For
example, Sony is planning to introduce its newer console six years after the
previous generation, and therefore, 2012 is a quite reasonable choice for Tp.
As we can see, the profit function convexity for 2012 is greater and it decays
faster than for the long term planning horizon scenario. Given this shorter
planning horizon the optimal time to launch Wii is July 2006, which at the
time of writing seems unlikely. In Figure 7 we depict this latter scenario and
in Figure 8 we depict the original scenario with Tp = 2020 and June 2007 as
optimal introduction time.
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5 Discussion
In this paper we introduced a model for two competitors who sequentially
launch new generations of their products, which amounts to an extension
of the well-known Norton and Bass (1987) model. The model contains pa-
rameters that can be estimated from actual sales data, but it also contains
parameters that need to be calibrated based on interviews with experts. We
show that the model can be embedded into an optimization routine, which
delivers the optimal timing of introducing new generations. We apply the
model and this routine of the real-life case of the optimal moment to launch
Nintendo’s Wii, and show that the empirical results suggest that around June
2007 should be optimal.
A limitation of our study is that we did not take the networks effects
literature into account. This literature predicts that one would only launch a
hardware technology later if this would only give superior intrinsic hard-
ware capabilities. (assuming upgrades/add-on’s are not an option). In-
direct network effects (software/complements/role of independent software
providers) are however considered as the main element regarding consumer
utility/adoption in hardware-software markets. Indeed, why would a con-
sumer adopt the hardware, if he/she does not also adopt the software? Con-
sumers are supposed to maximize their utility of the system and not just
the hardware. Further work should be directed to include such effects in our
bivariate successive-generations model.
Our model can be extended in various ways, where we mention the inclu-
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sion of more than two market players and more than two next generations.
Also, our model abstains from including software sales, and given that hard-
ware and software diffusion interact, a further extension of our model can
include software. Finally, the estimate of the optimal launch date of a next
generation does not yet come with standard errors, and it would be interest-
ing to derive these as well. Moreover, the model parameters are now based on
just a small amount of interviews, and more information could increase pre-
cision of the estimates. Further applications of our model and methodology
would yield further insights into their merits.
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6 Epilogue (June 15, 2006)
Nintendo is expected to launch the Wii at the same time, or even earlier, as
the PS3 (see http://wii.vggen.com/news/news.php?id=1276). An informed
colleague told us that at the latest E3 trade fair (held three weeks ago) the
Wii looked more finished compared to the PS3, and had more playable demos
available compared to the PS3. The PS3 also has to ’wait’ for the Blue-Ray
standard (next generation DVD) to be set, before it can launch.
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7 Tables and Figures
Figure 1: Diffusion and Substitution of Firms A and B Products.
29
Figure 2: Diffusion and Substitution of Firms A and B Products.
30
Figure 3: Diffusion and Substitution of Firms A and B Products.
31
Figure 4: Survey applied to get consumers and retailers parameter estimates.
32
Figure 5: Nintendo’s Profit Function given Wii launch date. (Consumers’
Scenario)
33
Figure 6: Profit functions shapes for different planning horizons.
34
Figure 7: Wii launched in July 2006. Planning horizon December 2012.
35
Figure 8: Wii launched in June 2007. Planning horizon December 2020.
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Console / Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Microsoft Xbox 0 1421 3509 3287 4096 2285
Sony PS2 5565 9879 12303 9381 7379 7663
Nintendo Gamecube 0 4162 5385 6325 3887 4009
Source: FirstCall Web Analyst Reports
Table 1: Game Consoles Hardware Sales in US and Japan (Thousand Units)
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Sales from to Sony PS2 to Sony PS3
Nintendo GameCube αN = −0.05 γN = 0.29
Nintendo Wii φN = −0.21 βN = −0.06
Table 4: Average of Consumers’ Estimates
40
Video Game Console p q m Sample
GameCube 0.19 0.71 21303 2001-2004
(0.01) (0.12) (1090.00)
Xbox 0.16 0.54 16001 2002-2005
(0.05) (0.35) (2574.88)
PlayStation2 0.18 0.59 30885 2001-2004
(0.04) (0.24) (3031.54)
Average 0.18 0.61 22729
Note: standard error in parenthesis
Table 5: Bass model estimates (WLS Method, Weight=1/Sales). The model
allows for heteroscedasticity as proposed by Boswijk and Franses (2005)
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p=0.15;
q=0.60;
a=q/p;
b=p+q;
ma1=30000;
ma2=35000;
mb1=13000;
mb2=15000;
t=0:(1/12):24;
tau1a=0;
tau2a=(73/12);
tau1b=(12/12);
tau2b=(81/12);
tau2b=0;
i=1; Tp=220;
for tau2b = 0:(1/12):24
af2=(1-exp(-b*(t-tau2a)))./(1+a.*exp(-b*(t-tau2a))).*(t-tau2a>=0);
af1=((1-exp(-b.*t))./(1+a*exp(-b.*t))).*(1-af2);
af1o=((1-exp(-b.*t))./(1+a*exp(-b.*t))); as1=ma1.*af1;
as2=af2.*ma2+(af1o.*ma1.*af2);
bf2=(1-exp(-b*(t-tau2b)))./(1+a.*exp(-b*(t-tau2a))).*(t-tau2b>=0);
bf1=((1-exp(-b.*(t-tau1b)))./(1+a*exp(-b.*(t-tau1b)))).*(t-tau1b>=0).*(1-bf2);
bf1o=((1-exp(-b.*t))./(1+a*exp(-b.*t))).*(t-tau1b>=0); bs1=mb1.*bf1;
bs2=bf2.*mb2+(bf1o.*mb1.*bf2);
alpha=0.6;
beta=0.0;
phi=-0.2;
rho=0.0;
as11=as1.*(1+alpha*bf2).*(1+beta*bf1);
as22=as2.*(1+phi*bf2).*(1+rho*bf1);
bs11=bs1.*(1-rho*af2).*(1-beta*af1);
bs22=bs2.*(1-phi*af2).*(1-alpha*af1);
tau2b=tau2b+(1/12); sales(i)=max(bs11(1,1:Tp))+max(bs22(1,1:Tp)); i=i+1;
end
total=max(sales); optime=find(max(sales));
plot (sales(1,1:150), ’DisplayName’,
’sales(1,1:150)’, ’YDataSource’, ’sales(1,1:150)’); figure(gcf)
Table 6: Matlab basic program
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